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Most scholars have attributed the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) brief and disastrous stay in 
power after the January 2011 uprising in Egypt to the MB’s political decisions, behavior and 
tactics. There is general academic agreement that President Muhammad Morsi’s government 
fell because of its failure to govern democratically, competently, and inclusively. To curb an 
escalation of conflict between the Morsi government and a growing opposition, therefore, the 
military had to overthrow the former on July 3, 2013. Such an interpretation of post-uprising 
Egyptian politics places primary responsibility on the MB for Egypt’s thwarted democratic 
transition. A variation of that interpretation links the MB’s ouster to the character of political 
Islam, its incompatibility with secular democracy, and the necessity of religious “reformation” 
to precede democratization in the Middle East. This essay argues, however, that the MB’s rule 
was short-lived because of three main factors: (1) the failure of the 2011 uprising to curb the 
power of Egypt’s key state institutions, mainly the military, police, and judiciary; (2) political 
polarization that drove an electorally defeated secular opposition to support military 
intervention against Morsi’s government; and (3) the inability of the MB-controlled elected 
Parliament and Presidency to impose their authority on unelected institutions in pursuit of 
major structural reform. In the end Egypt’s entrenched state derailed the post-Mubarak 
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Abstract 
Most scholars have attributed the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) brief and disastrous stay in power 
after the January 2011 uprising in Egypt to the MB’s political decisions, behavior and tactics. 
There is general academic agreement that President Muhammad Morsi’s government fell 
because of its failure to govern democratically, competently, and inclusively. To curb an 
escalation of conflict between the Morsi government and a growing opposition, therefore, the 
military had to overthrow the former on July 3, 2013. Such an interpretation of post-uprising 
Egyptian politics places primary responsibility on the MB for Egypt’s thwarted democratic 
transition. A variation of that interpretation links the MB’s ouster to the character of political 
Islam, its incompatibility with secular democracy, and the necessity of religious “reformation” to 
precede democratization in the Middle East. This essay argues, however, that the MB’s rule was 
short-lived because of three main factors: (1) the failure of the 2011 uprising to curb the power of 
Egypt’s key state institutions, mainly the military, police, and judiciary; (2) political polarization 
that drove an electorally defeated secular opposition to support military intervention against 
Morsi’s government; and (3) the inability of the MB-controlled elected Parliament and 
Presidency to impose their authority on unelected institutions in pursuit of major structural 
reform. In the end Egypt’s entrenched state derailed the post-Mubarak transition to restore 
authoritarian rule.  
 




Following its January 2011 uprising which ousted Hosni Mubarak from power less than a 
month later, Egypt’s first genuinely free elections brought the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to 
power. But a popularly desired “democratic transition” after decades of authoritarian rule turned 
out to be “nasty, brutish and short’ when a military coup overthrew the MB government in July 
2013.  
 
Most scholars have attributed the MB’s brief and disastrous stay in power to the MB’s 
political decisions, behavior and tactics. There seems to be academic agreement that the 
government of President Muhammad Morsi fell because it failed to govern democratically, 
competently, and inclusively (Wickham 2013; Khan 2014). To curb an escalation of conflict 
between the MB government and a growing opposition, therefore, the military was compelled to 
intervene decisively on July 3, 2013. Such an interpretation of post-uprising Egyptian politics 
primarily blames the MB for a thwarted democratic transition. A variation of that interpretation 
links the MB’s ouster to the character of political Islam, its incompatibility with secular 
democracy, and the necessity of religious “reformation” to precede democratization in the 
Middle East. This essay argues, however, that the MB’s rule was short-lived because of three 
main factors: (1) the failure of the 2011 uprising to curb the power of Egypt’s key state 
institutions, mainly the military, police, and judiciary; (2) political polarization drove an 
electorally defeated secular opposition to support military intervention in the post-Mubarak 
political process; and (3) the inability of the MB-controlled elected Parliament and Presidency to 
impose their authority on unelected institutions in order to implement major structural reforms. 
In the end an entrenched Egyptian state subverted democratic transition to restore authoritarian 
rule. 
 
It is important to point out that between Mubarak’s downfall in February 2011 and 
President Morsi’s ouster in July 2013 Egypt’s transition had two main phases. The first, lasting 
more than a year and a half under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), had an 
enduring impact on the second year-long phase under President Muhammad Morsi. In fact, 
SCAF dictated and continually changed the rules of the political game and state institutions of 
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the ancien regime managed the ill-fated course of post-Mubarak politics. The military 
government controlled the constitutional process, setting the rules for elections and the bounds of 
authority of elected institutions. The elections gave the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 45 
percent of the seats in parliament and its chairman, Morsi, the presidency. Newly established 
Islamist Salafist parties came second with about 25 percent of parliamentary seats. The MB also 
held a majority in the Shura Council (Upper House) with 58 percent of the seats. Through these 
electoral victories, the MB controlled the 100-member Constituent Assembly, selected by the two 
houses of parliament to draft a new constitution for Egypt.  
 
Analysts anticipated the MB’s rise to power via the ballot box at the post-uprising 
juncture. The oldest and best organized political organization in Egypt, the MB had a unified, 
functioning internal structure and strong ideological basis. Sometimes outlawed and long 
repressed since its founding in 1928, the MB’s participation in national politics and diverse 
forms of grassroots activism in civil society allowed the MB to build a significant support base. 
When Anwar Sadat (1970-81) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) gradually dismantled the 
Nasser-era populist ‘social contract’ that bound peasants, workers, youths, professionals, and the 
educated middle class to Egypt’s republican regimes (Hinnebusch 2000: 129–30), the MB 
maintained a deep and robust presence in society with its extensive social and economic services 
and penetration of professional associations and universities campuses (Wickham 2002). In past 
elections held under repressive rule, the MB had shown its ability to turn out millions of voters 
with its electoral machine and willingness to abide by electoral rules and cope with changing 
structures of contestation (Lust-Okar 2005).  
 
Unforeseen, however, was the 2013 military coup which imposed a vengeful and the 
most repressive regime Egypt has had (Hawthorne 2019). Scholars operating with conventional 
paradigms of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy considered the crucial transition to 
have taken place when free and fair elections gave the victorious MB a plurality in Parliament 
and control of the executive branch that had previously exercised centralized control of the state. 
The coup, however, demonstrated how effectively the military could dominate the process of 
transition and suppress popular demands for political participation. 
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Authoritarian ruler, strong institutions  
 
The 2011 uprising pitted popular mobilization against an authoritarian state 
entrenched in stable, centralized institutions that coordinated elite rule over a 
fragmented society and polarized opposition (Shehata 2009). The state institutions 
derived their strength from a tradition of hierarchical bureaucracy and administration 
that long unified Egypt in the Nile Valley and Delta where most of its population have 
lived (Wenke 1989) and established perhaps the world’s oldest state system (Handoussa 
1994: 9). Within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), moreover, Egypt has had a 
high degree of national identity, social homogeneity, and defined territorial boundaries 
(Gershoni and Jankowski 1986: 164) that predated the formation of post-colonial 
regimes. The state in 19th century Egypt consolidated its hold over society with an early 
and large-scale introduction of European technologies and bureaucratic models of 
authority (Toledano 1998: 261). Consequently, the presidential regimes of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak could wield influence over state institutions 
without overtly politicizing their character or identities. Yet key state institutions, the 
military most of all, could have a semblance of separation from each ruler and claim to 
serve national rather than their particularistic interests. During the 2011 uprising that 
separation of ruler from institutions was seen in the military’s relatively quick desertion 
of Mubarak, followed by the judicial dissolution of his National Democratic Party 
(NDP). Hence, Mubarak’s personalized system of political rule collapsed but the state 
apparatus remained virtually intact (Darwisheh 2014).  
 
Indeed, the military has been republican Egypt’s incontestable political 
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kingmaker, producing all of Egypt’s presidents – Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak – from 1953 to 2011. Despite its defeats in 
the battles of 1948 and 1967, the military retained political authority as an anti-colonial 
staunch defender of national sovereignty. Its resistance to the invasion of Suez Canal in 
1956 and its “victory” in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 reinforced its reputation as a 
patriotic institution and protector of the Egyptian nation in popular imagination (Van de 
Bildt 2015). In practice retired officers were de facto rulers of most of provincial Egypt, 
its local governors, and mayors and heads of government authorities managing state 
economic activities (Abul-Magd 2017). They worked behind the scenes, evaded the rule 
of law, and autonomously managed their affairs and finances while keeping an extensive 
presence in the economy and civilian bureaucracy (Sayigh and Ottaway 2012). Apart 
from exercising legal and de facto control over public assets, the military employed 
hundreds of thousands of civilians who enjoyed housing, healthcare, job security and 
other perks and had a direct interest in the military’s role in politics. The military was 
ironically regarded as the least corrupt state institution. When bread riots broke out in 
March 2008, the army gained a name for efficiency when it distributed bread from its 
own bakeries (Schenker 2011). In December 2011, the ruling military council showed 
its financial power by extending a USD 1 billion loan to the Egyptian central bank to 
shore up the faltering Egyptian pound (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat December 3, 2011). 
 
Among the social forces that revolted in January 2011, some distinguished 
between the Mubarak regime and state institutions. Many protestors, especially youth 
groups who had only known Mubarak’s rule, blamed him and his ilk for autocratic rule, 
corruption and abuse of power. They genuinely believed that their protests forced 
Mubarak’s fall and regarded their demands to have been met when he was removed and 
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his hated security police melted away. But the 2011 “revolutionaries” neither acted to 
seize power nor forged a unifying political program. It was as if many protesters 
believed that Egypt without Mubarak would do well without bottom-up pressure for 
radical reform that would seize authority from the military and infuse institutions with 
new modes of governance and state-society relations. If anything, anti-Mubarak 
protestors in Tahrir Square embraced soldiers, chanting, “The People and the Army are 
One Hand.” They only invited the military to side with them against Mubarak. 
 
In the event the generals, not the “revolutionaries,” removed Mubarak from 
power on February 11, 2011. To that degree, the military used the 2011 uprising to 
fortify its position within the power structure that was in danger of being captured by 
Mubarak’s family, the NDP headed by his son, Gamal, and the Ministry of Interior’s 
security agencies that supported them. Instead of having to endorse the old and ailing 
Mubarak’s succession as president by Gamal, the military could independently 
determine its own choice for the next president. With popular support from the 2011 
uprising, the military blocked the presidential succession without appearing to dictate 
political events or jeopardizing its status, power and interests.  
 
While Mubarak’s cronies disappeared and Gamal’s neoliberal capitalist allies 
faded, the armed forces united behind their leadership kept firm control of Egypt. Elite 
fragmentation has been suggested as an important condition for a successful democratic 
transition (O’Donnell et al. 1986). In Egypt, the elites in key institutions stayed 
sufficiently united to impose the rules and processes of the “transition” and take over 
executive authority from the fallen presidency. By abandoning Mubarak, the military 
posed as a partner, protector, and guide of the 2011 Revolution, ready to move Egypt 
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step by step in the direction of “democracy.”  In a replay of an old discourse of the 
inseparability of the military and the people (Van de Bildt 2015), the generals won 
popular support without actually enacting reform and accountability. 
 
At that juncture, a group of senior military generals established the SCAF,1 
which arrogated to itself the task of overseeing the transition for an initial period of six 
months (later extended to 18 months) according to its own rules. From then the SCAF 
frequently expanded its powers with constitutional declarations and amendments, 
effectively attaining authoritarian continuity and bureaucratic control while acceding to 
a hastily implemented electoral process to coopt some constituents and test the 
popularity of the opposition at the ballot box. The military deftly prevented a popular 
pluralistic post-uprising institutional order from emerging that could manage the 
pluralistic political spectrum of the uprising. Conscious of the risk of a direct 
confrontation with rebellious youth movements demanding genuine change, the 
generals’ strategy was to preempt a transition that entailed actual civilian oversight of 
the armed forces. At the same time, they wanted to end mass mobilization that could 
destabilize their rule and disrupt economic activities, for example, strikes by workers at 
military production sites (Beinin 2012).  
 
The military and the transition 
 
The collapse of Mubarak’s NDP left the MB as the only political organization 
                                                   
1 Headed by the then 75 years old Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, SCAF, Egypt’s highest 
military body, is composed of about 20 top senior military generals of each branch of the armed 
forces that convene in times of war and emergency. 
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with countrywide networks. The SCAF saw in the MB a social force that could calm the 
people down, get them off the streets and bring some degree of stability. The SCAF’s 
priority lay in curbing grassroots political dissent and cross-ideological mass 
mobilization that sustained collective action to pressure the regime and fight repression. 
Likewise, the MB preferred the streets demobilized to secure their position in a new 
order (Alexander 2011). Hence, the military’s best bet was an electoral process which it 
could oversee while it broadened its support base and kept the opposition divided. Early 
elections without a shared vision of the course of transition, a consensus over electoral 
rules,2 or reformed civilian institutions led to frenetic competition that exhausted and 
excluded the revolutionary forces, and prevented them from forming a broad-based 
national unity government.  
 
Consequently, the elections exacerbated the polarization of the opposition forces 
between Islamists who had solid bases and non-Islamists or secularists who lacked 
support and experience for effective electoral mobilization. Electoral victories and a 
clear parliamentary majority gave the Islamists a virtual monopoly over the drafting of a 
new constitution. Here, the SCAF’s plan of transition, with decision-making based on 
majority rule, undermined prospects for a consensus among the revolutionary forces. 
Between Mubarak’s and Morsi’s overthrow, Egyptians went to the polls five times – for 
the March 2011 constitutional referendum (which was replaced by the SCAF’s 
constitutional declaration in the same month),3 the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, 
                                                   
2 The military set a complex electoral law, where one-third of parliamentary seats were 
reserved for independents and the remaining two thirds for party lists. 
3 The military appointed a constitutional reform committee which made eight revisions to 
Egypt’s constitution. On March 19, with 41 percent voter turnout, Egyptians voted in a 
referendum and approved the amendments at 77.2 percent of the votes. Two weeks later, 
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the 2012 elections to the Shura Council (Upper House), the 2012 presidential election, 
and the December 2012 constitutional referendum.  
 
As it were, the process of transition had been confined to the conduct of 
elections that intensified struggles among the opposition forces instead of mobilizing 
popular demands for reforming the political system. In a milieu of raging 
intra-opposition battles, state institutions, notably the judiciary and the military, gained 
leverage and authority by mediating between winners and losers. The military 
maximized its legal authority through decrees and laws (constitutional declarations) and 
broadened its jurisdiction, in each case with the sanction of the judiciary. Judges 
appointed by Mubarak had vested interest in limiting the pace of change so that state 
institutions could safeguard their interests, maintain impunity, and subvert the formation 
of a more constructive political framework. For instance, the Mubarak regime’s 
notorious State of Emergency Law4 was actually extended to cover the disturbance of 
traffic, the blockade of roads and the spread of rumors. A new law criminalized workers’ 
strikes and the penal code had a new chapter that outlawed “spreading terror and 
threatening law and order.” Furthermore, the code of military justice was amended to 
give military tribunals sole jurisdiction over officers accused of making ill-gotten gains 
(El-Ghobashy 2016). In the first ten months of SCAF rule, more than 12,000 civilians 
and opponents of the regime were subjected to speedy military trials. With the judicial 
                                                                                                                                                     
however, and in disregard for popular will, the SCAF issued an interim constitution of 63 
articles, which was not presented to popular approval, to describe how Egypt should be 
governed during the transitional period.  
4 Egypt’s emergency law had been in place continuously since the assassination of president 
Anwar Sadat in October 1981, who was succeeded by Mubarak.  Lifting of the law was a key 
demand of the 2011 uprising.  
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sanction of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), the military retained its right to 
overrule any part of the constitution that contradicted the “basic tenets of the Egyptian 
state and society” (Sayigh 2011). In other words, the judiciary placed the military above 
the constitution and all opposition forces, Islamist and non-Islamist. The judiciary 
intervened in the electoral process by disqualifying high-profile presidential candidates5 
who had generated passionate support in the run-up to the 2012 elections. In particular 
the judiciary prohibited the MB’s chosen presidential candidate, its leading strategist 
and key financier, Khairat al-Shater,6 from standing. The MB was forced to field 
Muhammad Morsi, who joined the MB in 1970s, and was known for his loyalty to the 
MB leadership. 
 
In fact, military intervention in the electoral and political outcomes during the 
transition went further. On November 1, 2011, just two weeks before parliamentary 
elections were held, the military wanted to impose so-called supra-constitutional 
principles drafted by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmi of Isam Sharaf’s interim 
cabinet. Unelected officials were put in charge of creating a new constitution, 22 articles 
of which placed the military as the ultimate guarantor of the constitutional order. The 
military’s aggrandizement was abundantly clear from Article 9 and Article 10 of the 
principles that precluded the military budget from review by Parliament. The document 
provoked outrage as it was seen to be the military’s attempt to grab power before the 
new constitution was drafted. Mass protests forced the Selmi document to be withdrawn 
                                                   
5 The High Election Commission disqualified ten candidates in all, including the MB’s chosen 
Khairat el-Shater; Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s former vice president and intelligence chief; and 
Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a popular Salafist leader. 
6 Egypt’s presidential electoral commission disqualified al-Shatir on the grounds that he was 
released from prison in the previous six years (he was released from prison in March 2011) 
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but by then the military was determined not to be subject to the authority of elected 
institutions. The military would veto any legislation related to military matters, 
including the military’s economic activities,7 decisions on war and peace or even the 
composition of the 100-member constitution-drafting committee. Nor had the military 
any intention of ceding its privileges to the elected parliament and presidency. In the 
end, the Selmi principles were largely incorporated into the constitutions that were 
passed under Morsi (and, after the 2013 coup, Sisi). The military dominated the 
National Defense Council, maintained exclusive control of defense policies, and kept its 
budget and economy above public scrutiny and state oversight.  
 
The MB from victory to polarization to defeat   
 
The first phase of the transition under SCAF rule marked the end of the implicit 
cross-class and cross-ideological coalition that overthrew Mubarak. But victory over 
Mubarak exposed the lack of a shared strategy to extract power from the state. Without 
a clear vision and defined goals, the protests lost momentum once the dictator was gone. 
Without a high degree of popular mobilization, the opposition could not hold the 
political elites accountable or construct a new constitutional order. To compound the 
opposition’s weakness, the military and other state institutions found support from part 
of the social forces that rose against Mubarak – above all, the secular forces who feared 
the Islamists and were prepared to block their rise to power by allying with the state. In 
                                                   
7 The military in Egypt has been playing a significant role in the economy by providing all sorts 
of products and services from basic consumer goods to housing construction, resort 
management, and arm manufacturing. Therefore, any genuine democratic transformation would 
have posed a threat to the military as democracy would place its budget to public oversight by 
elected institutions.  
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that sense, the first, SCAF-ruled, phase of the “transition” rebounded on the second, 
MB-ruled, phase. The opposition underwent crucial realignments and polarization that 
resulted in the willingness of part of the original anti-Mubarak movement to support 
state institutions and the military’s political involvement.8 
Actually, the MB and the non-Islamists did not split over such issues as the 
position of the military or the old elites. Nor did they disagree on the demands of the 
2011 uprising, which included ending corruption and police brutality, and improving 
socio-economic conditions. Instead, their early disagreements over the course of the 
transition mutated into existential issues such as the identity of the state (whether it 
should be a ‘civil state’, dawla madaniya, or a civil state with an Islamic reference), the 
role of Sharia, constitutional articles, and so on. Overlooked in all this was the position 
of the military in the state. Indeed, a Pew Research Center poll conducted in March 
2013 showed that the military still remained the most trusted and popular of the political 
forces in Egypt. About 73 percent of those polled said that the military had a good 
influence on the country, albeit lower than the 88 percent registered in a 2011 survey 
conducted a few weeks after Mubarak was ousted.9  
                                                   
8 The collective action between Islamists and non-Islamists was further undermined by the 
so-called ‘Second Revolution’ or the Battle of Muhammad Mahmoud Street on November 19, 
2011. Protestors gathering near Tahrir Square demanded justice for their relatives who were 
killed during the January 2011 uprising, the resignation of the government, reform of the 
interior ministry, and the transfer of power from the SCAF to a civilian president. The police 
and the military attacked the protestors who clashed with the security forces over five days. 
However, activists had lost the ability to mount massive protests while the Islamists, mainly the 
MB, boycotted the protests and kept silent on the security assaults on the protestors. 
9 Pew Research Center (25 April 2011) “Egyptians Embrace Revolt Leaders, Religious Parties, 
and Military, As Well,” available at: 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2011/04/25/egyptians-embrace-revolt-leaders-religious-par
ties-and-military-as-well/ (accessed 5 November 2020); “Egyptian military gets higher ratings 
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Another weakness of the opposition was its flawed grasp of the new balance of 
power created by the uprising itself. The outcome of the uprising meant different things 
to different segments of the revolutionary forces that included youth groups, and leftist, 
liberal, and secular parties. The secularists and liberals were not institutionalized forces 
that could negotiate, compromise, or form coalitions with the Islamists. The former’s 
electoral defeats and exclusion from the drafting of a new constitution conditioned them 
to regard the MB’s rise to power as an ideological and political threat they could not 
reverse through democratic mechanisms. Having to choose between participating in the 
formal electoral process and continuing to mount street protests to renew their 
revolutionary legitimacy, they chose the latter. They thereby hoped to compel the 
military to change the political rules in their favor. But their organizational weaknesses, 
inexperience, abstention from electoral contestations, and anti-Islamist mobilization 
ruled out the formation of a cross-class and cross-ideological coalition around which a 
new polity could be established. By pitting the legitimacy of the street against the 
legitimacy of the new elected parliament, the non-Islamists made little effort to build 
new representative institutions to challenge or replace the existing ones.  
 
It has been variously argued that “the 2011 revolution was an example of 
‘dispersed mobilization’ that is not indicative of collective goals or shared values” 
(Rennick 2013: 3), or that “the various forces that participated in the revolution spent 
little of the ten months since their stunning victory in Tahrir Square party-building, with 
                                                                                                                                                     
than most political parties,” available at: 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/01/egyptian-military-gets-higher-ratings-than-
most-political-parties/ (accessed 5 November 2013).  
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many of them eschewing party politics on principle and others focusing, instead, on the 
politics of protest rather than of party organization” (Brown 2012: 4). Hence, although 
the uprising ‘pushed for change and reforms in, and through, the institutions of the 
existing regime’ (Bayat 2013: 53), the lack of organizational strength, cohesiveness and 
visibility hampered a determined drive towards accountability and institutional reform. 
By default, perhaps, and not just by design, state institutions became veto players during 
the transition.  
 
The revolutionary forces were not merely split along an Islamist-secularist 
divide. This was evident from the distribution of votes among liberal and revolutionary 
figures ahead of the 2012 presidential elections: the Nasserite Hamdin Sabahi (21 
percent), the liberal Islamist Abdul Mun’im Abul Futuh (18 percent), the MB’s 
Muhammad Morsi (25 percent), the secular ex-military Ahmed Shafiq (24 percent of the 
vote), and the secular ex-diplomat Amr Musa (11 percent). The collective votes of the 
secular candidates exceeded those won by the MB or the old regime alone. Had the 
revolutionary forces united behind one candidate, the transition might have resulted in a 
balance between a secularist executive and an Islamist legislature that could have 
encouraged the MB and the non-Islamist forces to negotiate and compromise – instead 
of the latter’s forming an alliance with the state to end the MB’s rule. In the past, when 
it labored to survive authoritarian rule, when electoral victory was unimaginable, the 
MB kept a patient, gradualist approach to political participation. But Mubarak’s 
precipitous overthrow created an opening that enticed the MB away from its gradualist 
approach. Now the superbly organized MB also had little incentive to compromise with 
their weak, unorganized and divided non-Islamist opponents. In the event the MB won 
all the elections but real power still lay in the institutions of the old regime. 
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The MB’s cooperation with other forces was also hindered by the rise of a 
conservative leadership in the MB prior to 2011. The rise was partly forced by the 
heavy repression that the Mubarak regime unleashed against the MB’s reformists after 
its members had won around 20 per cent of the seats in Parliament in 2005. In 2007, 
Mubarak amended the constitution to prevent the MB from making further electoral 
gains (Shehata and Stacher 2007; Lynch 2008). Within the MB, the response to 
repression widened the rift between conservatives, who feared for the survival of the 
movement, and reformists who pressed for political participation and openness. As 
political space was reduced, so the reformists were weakened vis-à-vis the conservatives. 
The growing influence of figures such as Mahmoud Izzat, Khairat al-Shatir, and Mahdi 
Akif in the MB’s Shura Council and the Guidance Bureau, the results of MB’s internal 
election in late 2009, and the election of Muhammad Badie as its new leader in 2010 
handed control to the seniors and conservatives (Al-Anani 2010). The struggle between 
conservatives and reformists was compounded by the defection of important reformists, 
such as Deputy General Guide Muhammad Habib, Leadership Bureau member Abdul 
Mun‘im Abul Futuh and certain prominent leaders of the 1970s, who accused the 
leadership of violating the MB’s regulations and illegally engineering Badie’s ascent. 
 
With little encouragement to compromise with other political forces or to be 
content with partial victory, the MB’s conservative leadership decided to support the 
SCAF’s transition plan and declined to join anti-SCAF protests. Soon, the MB became 
preoccupied with the procedural aspects of transition as opposed to the task of building 
political alliances at which their reformist leaders were masters under authoritarian rule. 
In a way, the conservative leadership was correct: the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party 
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won every one of five elections held between March 2011 and December 2012. In 
another sense, all that was a Pyrrhic victory: the more handily the MB won, the more 
polarized Egyptian society was between Islamists and non-Islamists. The MB lost a part 
of the populist legitimacy and sympathy they had garnered under authoritarian rule. 
Above all, its victory in isolation left the MB incapable of leading broad alliances to 
win concessions from the state and vulnerable to renewed repression.  
 
Despite its populist ideology and rhetoric that resonated with many Egyptians, 
the MB was not a revolutionary movement. Its leaders preferred gradualist “reform” 
within the existing institutional structure over confrontation with the state apparatus. 
This set the MB apart from other radical and militant Islamist movements. Unlike the 
non-Islamist opposition, the MB was wary of revolutionary transformation. The MB 
knew that the uprising had not uprooted a political order firmly controlled by the old 
regime. But the MB’s long experience had helped it to build a disciplined organization 
known for patient social outreach, efficient electoral politics and extensive campaigning. 
The MB took to formal democracy because it seemed unrealistic to leave behind 60 
years of authoritarianism quickly. Egypt required a procedural democracy to build 
democratic institutions that restrained both leaders and opposition in their fight for 
power. In other words, for the MB, the state was doing well if it introduced 
accountability, accepted the rule of law, and reformed the judiciary. To overcome the 
opposition of revolutionary forces to an election- based transition and to force its 
non-Islamist opponents to accept their electoral defeat, the MB sought to legalize its 
victories through the rule of law and constitution-making. To craft a new constitution, 
the MB needed its electoral victories to be endorsed by the military, the police, and the 
judiciary. This explains why the 2012 constitution drafted by the MB acquiesced to the 
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military’s demands that its budget should not be subject to civilian oversight, the 
defense minister had to be an army general, and the National Defense Council had to 
have a majority of military commanders. But such a statist approach to change ceded 
absolute power to the military.  
 
The MB’s strategy led it to win elections under military rule that the judiciary 
later nullified. The MB made two catastrophic errors. First, the MB expected to benefit 
from elections and thought that reform was possible even when the military held its veto 
power over elected institutions. After Morsi was elected president with electoral turnout 
of 52 percent, the MB underestimated how alienated it was from the public when the 
non-Islamists were ready to work with the old regime to remove the MB from power. 
Second, the MB leadership ruled out any thought of a military coup. Morsi trusted the 
SCAF’s youngest member, the pious 57-year old Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and appointed him 
Minister of Defense in consultation with the SCAF. The media soon questioned Sisi’s 
relationship with the MB. For instance, Tawfiq Okasha, host of a Talk Show on 
Al-Fara’een television, warned of a threat of the “Brotherhoodization” of the state, and 
accused Sisi of being an MB member and Morsi’s man in the military council (Mellor 
2017: 205). The MB leadership believed that they had an accord with the military by 
agreeing with younger generals to protect them from civilian oversight. On his part Sisi 
denied any intention to seize power – unless “called upon by the people”. He tactically 
drew the military back from the political scene while he monitored the decline of 
Morsi’s popularity among an increasingly restive population. The secular opposition, 
itself in disarray, regarded the military as the only force that could balance the MB’s 
influence. On July 1, 2013, when an interviewer asked if he trusted the military, Morsi 
replied, “Absolutely.” Two days later the military overthrew Morsi and brutally 
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suppressed the MB with the support of the anti-MB forces (Tamimi 2014).  
 
Elected Institutions without Authority  
 
In elections held during the SCAF-dictated transition, the MB won a clear 
popular mandate with 235 out of 508 seats in Parliament and 105 out of 180 seats in the 
Upper House. Initially, to reassure Egyptians that it did not seek political dominance, 
the MB’s Shura Council pledged that it would not field a candidate for president. 
However, the MB retracted its decision for two main reasons. First, the SCAF retained 
far-reaching legislative powers vis-à-vis a parliament that was in constant danger of 
being boycotted by non-Islamist forces and being dissolved on judicial grounds. 
Without a new constitution, moreover, the MB parliamentarians were severely restricted 
and the military remained kingmaker and manipulator of post-Mubarak transformations. 
Second, despite its parliamentary strength, the MB leadership feared losing its influence 
with the challenge for the presidency by other Islamists (Abu Futouh who was expelled 
from the MB a year earlier and MB turned Salafist Abu Ismail) (Hamid 2014: 154) and 
secular candidates (ex-diplomat Amr Mousa and ex-general Ahmed Shafiq, the last 
prime minister under Mubarak). The MB considered these candidates to be hostile to its 
interests. In the event, the MB fielded Muhammad Morsi who won the presidential 
election by a very small margin against Ahmed Shafiq.  
 
The arrival of Egypt’s first democratically elected civilian president commenced 
a power struggle between the MB and the state institutions – over the composition of 
the Cabinet and the constituent assembly charged with drafting a new constitution, and 
the schedule and rules for new parliamentary elections. Through the judiciary, the 
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military undermined the popular mandate of the newly elected institutions. For instance, 
on June 14, 2012, two days before the second round of presidential elections that pitted 
Muhammad Morsi against Ahmed Shafik, and one day after Parliament announced the 
formation of the second Constituent Assembly, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) 
ruled the parliament ‘unconstitutional’ because one-third of the parliament members 
were ‘illegally elected’. The SCAF immediately dissolved Parliament by decree, issued 
a constitutional declaration that returned its generals uncontested, assumed broad 
legislative powers, and dominated the constitution-drafting process.  
 
Another SCAF constitutional declaration required the new president to be sworn 
in, not before Parliament but the SCC. This shift reflected the alliance of state 
institutions which distrusted the elected president and viewed the MB as outsiders and 
old enemies of the state. An outraged Morsi refused to take his oath of office before the 
Mubarak-appointed SCC. In a symbolic gesture of defiance, he took his oath in Tahrir 
Square, the birthplace of the 2011 uprising. He vowed to achieve the aims of the 
uprising and reclaim his legitimate presidential powers. He insisted that no institution 
could stay above the law, and told the crowds that they were the source of authority (Lo 
2019). A day later, however, Morsi relented and took his oath before the SCC. He 
effectively accepted the court’s decision to dissolve parliament although he hinted at a 
continued contest for power over the institutions of government and the future 
constitution. Morsi took his oath before Mubarak-appointed chief justices, such as Adly 
Mansour (who became interim president after Morsi’s overthrow). When he invited 
Morsi to take the oath, Judge Farouq Sultan specifically cited the authority of the 
interim constitution issued by military decree on June 17, 2012 which transferred 
powers of the president’s office to the generals. On his part, Morsi stressed the 
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separation of powers, promising that the president “will work to guarantee the 
independence of these powers and authorities.” 
 
The dissolution of the MB-controlled parliament pushed Morsi to shield himself 
from the judiciary by concentrating power in the presidency that was itself unrestricted 
by any legislature. Morsi tried to stop the SCC from subverting the constitutionality of 
the CA, the Upper House, and the presidency. He wanted to remove electoral politics 
from judicial review by asserting presidential authority. On November 22, 2012, Morsi 
issued a presidential decree that temporarily gave him powers beyond the reach of any 
court or judge. He sought to prevent the judiciary from interfering in the 
constitution-drafting process. He used his new authority to order the retrial of Mubarak 
after dismissing Mubarak-appointed Prosecutor General Abdel Maguid Mahmoud who 
was considered by many secular oppositions to have protected leaders of the old regime 
from being held accountable for their past actions. 
  
Morsi’s decree backfired. It upset non-Islamists and antagonized the military and 
the judiciary. Thousands of protestors surrounded the presidential palace in Cairo while 
the military and the security forces were absent when protestors attacked dozens of MB 
offices around the country. Morsi’s decree was not the first to be issued in post-Mubarak 
Egypt. The military had used decrees to entrench its position. But Morsi’s decree was 
denounced by the secular opposition as an assault on democracy and regarded by the 
judiciary as a defiance of state institutions. Forced to cancel the decree – the military 
warned of “disastrous consequences” – Morsi pressed on with a referendum on a draft 
constitution. The secular opposition opposed his move while many judges refused to 
monitor the voting at the polling centers. After a widely boycotted referendum, Morsi 
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signed the new constitution into law at the end of December 2012.  
 
The new constitution eliminated omnipotent presidency (Article 226) by limiting 
the president to two terms and empowered the parliament and prime minster to 
withdraw confidence from the government. Article 236 canceled all decrees and laws 
(passed by the SCAF and Morsi) that preceded the adaptation of the new constitution. 
And Article 51 allowed any one to form a political party without government censorship, 
whereas under Mubarak the ruling NDP controlled the formation of political parties 
through the Party Formation Committee, thereby ensuring no other party could develop 
to challenge its rule. But the Higher Elections Council declared that just under 33 
percent of eligible voters had voted – the lowest proportion since the transition began – 
which implied that the constitution fell short of the national support such a document 
needed for legitimacy.   
 
Between them the SCAF and the judiciary had deprived the president of an 
MB-majority parliament, a new constitution, and genuine authority over the mammoth 
bureaucracy, patronage networks and interests of the old regime, and the huge military 
presence in the economy and politics. Unable to control key ministries of the interior, 
defense and foreign affairs, the MB could barely reform the state to deal with Egypt’s 
endemic socioeconomic conditions.  But, without implementing far-reaching structural 
reforms, the MB – for that matter whoever else that won the elections – could not solve 
economic problems as a restive populace demanded. 
 
The economy deteriorated. Worsening unemployment, a big factor in the 2011 
uprising, heightened political tensions. In the popular view, Morsi and the MB, being 
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the victors in the electoral transition, had to meet the socioeconomic demands of the 
2011 uprising which had rallied the masses around basic slogans of “bread, freedom and 
social justice.” Political instability, however, kept investors at bay and tourists away. 
The economy grew at its lowest rate, the currency depreciated, and foreign reserves 
dwindled. High youth unemployment, officially 13 percent, continued to rise. The 
economic conditions were now worse than those that triggered the 2011 uprising. The 
political stalemate further undermined the economy, bringing more street protests that 
demanded Morsi’s fall. The flow of aid from allies, such as Qatar, Turkey and Libya, 
kept Egypt afloat. But soaring food prices, and severe shortage in fuel and electricity, 
which led to dozens of people killed and wounded at gas lines, posed grave threats to 
the MB’s fragile rule and legitimacy.10 At street level, law and order seemed to have 
broken down with aggravated traffic snarls, heightened incidence of crime, and 
persistent clashes between protestors and security forces. Yet a beleaguered Morsi was 
compelled to praise the police as a key protector of stability. In short, an absence of 
economic improvement, or a reduction in the  brutality of the security forces fostered a 
public perception that the goals of their revolution had not been attained (Brumberg and 
Sallam 2012) and elections were pointless when protestors were being killed.   
 
In the tense milieu of late April 2013, members of the Egyptian Movement for 
                                                   
10 Following Morsi’s ouster on July 3, 2013, the New York Times reported the sudden 
improvement in Egypt such as the police returning to the streets and the miraculous end to 
energy subsidies seemed to suggest the significant role of the ancien regime in the crisis. 
“Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi,” New York Times, 
July 10, 2013. 
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Change (Kefaya),11 which regrouped the forces that brought Mubarak down, mounted 
an anti-Morsi campaign called Tamarod (meaning revolt or rebellion). Soon labelled the 
“second revolution” of June 30, 2013, Tamarod claimed to be a youth group whose 
main goal was to collect signatures for a petition to demand Morsi’s removal and fresh 
presidential elections. The campaign, however, was financed by a big businessman and 
Mubarak crony, Nagid Sawiris, received funding and support from the United Arab 
Emirates (Holmes 2019: 252), abetted by former SCC Judge, Tahani El-Gebali, 
organized and aided by the Ministry of Interior and security services, and given massive 
media exposure (Darwisheh 2018; Letourneau 2019). Whether or not Tamarod was 
genuinely started by young activists acting on their own, as its leaders claimed, the 
movement endorsed a form of political struggle in which it was legitimate for the army 
to remove an elected president if enough protestors asked for it (Faris 2013). In a matter 
of weeks, pro-Tamarod protests spread to most governorates via an orchestrated 
campaign that required extensive organization and resources beyond the capacity of a 
new and small youth group. 
 
The public did not fear joining the anti-Morsi protests. The protestors knew that, 
unlike in 2011, neither the police nor the military would assault anti-Morsi 
demonstrations or defend the MB. As the secular opposition strongly pushed for 
military intervention, the now favorably regarded military issued an ultimatum: the MB 
and its opponents should find a solution or the military will impose its “roadmap for the 
future.” On July 3, following three days of large-scale, anti-Morsi demonstrations 
                                                   
11 Kefaya, meaning “enough”, is a grassroots movement that played an instrumental role in 
opposing hereditary transition under years before the 2011 uprising against Mubarak.  
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backed by the judiciary and the police, the SCAF staged a coup and overthrew Morsi. 
The coup represented the ultimate triumph of state institutions: Field Marshal Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi appeared on national television with the SCC justices standing behind him. 
Sisi announced the suspension of the constitution, the arrest and detention of Morsi at 






As the preceding discussion showed, the deep legacy of authoritarian rule 
undermined “democratic transition” in post-Mubarak Egypt. The transition had neither a 
national dialogue nor political pact between the ruling elite and the revolutionary forces. 
Without a road map that could secure consensus among different opposition groups, the 
political process was hindered by judicial and legal complications. Electoral institutions 
built on shaky grounds produced severe political and ideological polarization among 
erstwhile allies of the 2011 uprising. Key state institutions hostile to reform remained 
intact as a nascent new constitutional order was subverted by military authority and 
judicial intervention. The polarization gave state institutions the pretext to stage a clash 
of two legitimacies, as it were, based in Tahrir Square and the elected parliament. In that 
way the military could claim its overthrow of Morsi and the MB saved Egypt from 
chaos and terrorism.  
 
Unlike the military, the MB turned out to be a secondary actor whose “agency” 
was too weak to consolidate the legitimacy the movement gained at the ballot box. In a 
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very difficult situation, Morsi and the MB faced two options: compromise with an 
unreformed state, or compromise with a restive and unorganized street protest. It was 
part of their failed strategy and administration that Morsi could not demobilize his 
opponents in society but chose instead to appease the military. The MB had a strong 
presence in society but virtual absence in state institutions that had for decades 
distrusted the movement and feared its surge during the transition. In the end, the 
military realized its counter-revolutionary intent via an equally unreformed judiciary, 
which kept invalidating the MB’s electoral victories, and the manipulated Tamarod and 
broader anti-MB secular opposition.  
 
A military coup was, arguably, not the only alternative to the MB’s majoritarian 
rule. Daunting as the prospect was the non-Islamists could have chosen to face the MB 
in future parliamentary elections. If the MB was as unpopular as its secular opponents 
charged, then the latter could move a no-confidence vote against the government, or 
even impeach the president if the opposition could win a two-thirds majority in a 
subsequent election. Such options would have strengthened the cause of Egyptian 
democracy. On the pretext of combatting ‘totalitarian Islamist fascism’, though, the 
secular opposition allied themselves with their old foes – proven repressive and 
anti-democratic institutions – only to be subjected to harsher rule than they had 
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